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A growing number of countries have anchored their monetary policy to an explicit numerical rate 
or range of inflation since such an inflation targeting framework was first adopted by New 
Zealand in 1989. This paper empirically investigates issues associated with inflation targeting 
using a dataset of 66 countries for the 1980–2000 period.  
The paper focuses on two issues. First, which factors are systematically associated with a 
country’s decision to adopt inflation targeting as its monetary framework? Second, does inflation 
targeting improve the performance of inflation and output? Does the trade-off between inflation 
and output variability change under such a framework? 
The empirical results are informative and encouraging. A number of economic conditions, 
structure, and institution variables are significantly associated with the choice of inflation 
targeting. Both descriptive statistics and regression results suggest that inflation targeting does 
play a beneficial role in improving the performance of inflation and output. This paper explores 
an evident and positive relationship between inflation and output variability, which is different 
from the view based on the Taylor Curve. But the author finds limited support for the proposition 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists and policymakers have long sought the holy grail of monetary policy. Since New 
Zealand first adopted an inflation targeting framework in 1989, a growing number of countries 
have anchored their monetary policies to an explicit numerical rate or range of inflation. 
According to my count, by the end of 2002, there were 22 inflation targeting countries;
1 two 
countries (Argentina and Turkey) are possibly on their way, and G3 and other emerging 
economies could join this club in the future.  
Inflation targeting has been increasingly viewed as a good monetary policy framework and 
widely applauded by economists and policymakers. In the literature, the benefits of inflation 
targeting on inflation and output can be summarized in two strands. First, inflation targeting 
improves the performance of inflation and output. In other words, an inflation targeting 
framework could lower the level and variability of inflation, increase output growth but decrease 
its variability, and diminish the persistence of inflation. For example, Neumann and von Hagen 
(2002) compare statistics for inflation targeters and nontargeters across different periods and find 
that inflation targeting reduces the volatility of inflation, output, and interest rates. Second, 
inflation targeting improves inflation forecasting by lowering the level of expected inflation 
and/or increasing its predictability (Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001; Johnson 
2002; and Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001).  
On the other hand, an almost equal number of studies claim not to find clear evidence 
supporting the benefits of inflation targeting, though their results do not provide arguments 
against it either. For example, Ball and Sheridan (2003) examine changes in the level and 
variability of inflation and output as well as the persistence of inflation for seven inflation 
targeters and 13 nontargeters among industrial countries. They conclude that countries on average 
improved their performance in the 1990s, but there is no significant evidence that inflation 
targeters performed better than nontargeters. Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999) argue?based on a 
study of 23 countries (including nine inflation targeters) over the 1984–97 period?that inflation 
aversion increased, but inflation targeting made little difference in the 1990s.  
The resulting empirical difference in the inflation targeting literature is partly because of 
the small number of inflation targeting countries and the short history of this new monetary 
framework. It will perhaps take more than a decade for inflation targeting to become fully 
credible and to be fully studied. At this point, empirical investigations of inflation targeting can 
                                                 
1 The number of inflation targeting countries might vary depending on the definition of inflation targeting. 
This issue is further discussed in section 2.   3
provide a reasonable evaluation of what has been done and a sensible suggestion about what 
might happen under an inflation targeting framework. 
This paper investigates issues associated with inflation targeting using a dataset of 66 
countries for the 1980–2000 period. It focuses on two issues: (1) factors systematically associated 
with a country’s choice of inflation targeting and (2) the effects of inflation targeting on the 
performance of inflation and output and on the trade-off between inflation and output variability. 
This paper goes beyond previous work in two respects. First, most of the existing literature 
examines the effects of inflation targeting after countries adopt it as their monetary framework 
but rarely asks whether there are prominent factors that systematically lead a country to choose 
inflation targeting. Second, the dataset in this paper is comprehensive, covering 66 countries over 
a 20-year period from 1980 to 2000. It comprises OECD, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa, of which 22 countries are inflation targeters based on the definition used in this paper. 
The wide coverage of the dataset permits a better assessment of the performance of inflation 
targeters compared with nontargeters. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and variables and reports 
on preliminary statistical analysis. Section 3 describes the research methodologies employed and 
presents the empirical results. The results are encouraging and informative, in spite of the small 
number of inflation targeting countries and the short history these countries have had to 
implement the inflation targeting framework. Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. DATA AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS   
The sample in this paper covers annual observations for 66 countries for the 1980–2000 
period? 22 are inflation targeting countries and the remaining 44 are taken as potential inflation 
targeting countries (see appendix 1). Sample periods for a few emerging countries are shorter 
depending on their data availability. For example, data on Eastern European economies including 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Russia are 
available only after their transition was completed in the 1990s.  
Data were collected on the 21 variables listed in appendix 2, of which nine are for 
economic conditions/performance (C), eight are for economic structure (E), and three are for 
economic institutions (I).
2 A variable for nonfuel commodity price is also included, which is 
measured as the annual change of world nonfuel commodity price. The variables for economic 
conditions, structure, and institutions are discussed in detail below.  
                                                 
2 The classification of some variables is arbitrary because they could be placed in more than one category. 
The categories are useful for us in thinking about the expected signs of coefficients.   4
 
Economic Conditions Variables 
The nine variables representing a country’s economic performance are real GDP growth and its 
variability, real GDP gap, nominal and real interest rates, inflation rate and its variability, foreign 
exchange pressure, and M2 growth. 
GDP growth variability is measured in two ways: one measures GDP growth variability by 
the standard deviation of the average GDP growth of the whole study period, which is used in the 
regressions of the choice of inflation targeting and the other measures GDP growth variability by 
the standard deviation of a five-year rolling average of GDP growth, which is used in the 
regressions of the effects of inflation targeting. And the inflation variability is measured by the 
standard deviation of a five-year rolling average of the inflation rate. 
The variable for foreign exchange pressure is worth special discussion. A number of 
countries adopted the inflation targeting framework during or in the aftermath of financial crises. 
These countries include Finland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom in Western Europe; 
Brazil and Mexico in Latin America, Korea and Thailand in Asia; and the Czech Republic in 
Eastern Europe. Thus, it is reasonable to question whether foreign exchange pressure is 
systematically associated with the choice of inflation targeting. 
The foreign exchange pressure variable to identify periods of financial stress is created 
following the methodology of Kamin, Schindler, and Samuel (KSS 2001), using in part their 
results but also extending their dataset to a larger group of countries. In KSS, the foreign 
exchange pressure variable is constructed as “the weighted average of two-month percentage 
changes in the real bilateral exchange rate against dollar and in international reserves, with the 
weights being proportional to the inverse of the standard deviation of these series. Declines in 
these weighted averages in excess of 1.75 standard deviations indicate a crisis month.” Generally, 
any year in which a crisis month occurs is considered to be a crisis year. The additional crisis 
months should be identified in the subsequent year, but it is not considered a new crisis when one 
of three conditions is met (KSS 2001).
3  
The KSS paper assembles the foreign exchange pressure variable for 26 emerging-market 
economies, of which 25 are listed in my sample. The KSS calculations are then extended to the 
remaining 41 countries but used the real bilateral exchange rate against the deutsche mark instead 
of the US dollar for the European Union countries.  
                                                 
3 KSS (2001) identify three exception rules as: 1) the exchange rate pressure variable recovers to its prior 
level before falling significantly again, 2) there is a lapse of more than four months in which no monthly 
crisis is signaled, or 3) a monthly crisis is signaled after June in the second year.    5
My results show by construction that all sample countries had experienced foreign 
exchange pressure at least once during the 1980–2000 period, and the identified crisis years 
appeared to be consistent with historical descriptions. 
 
Economic Structure Variables  
Eight variables are chosen to describe a country’s structure characteristics?nominal and real 
effective exchange rate variability, fiscal position, current account position, trade openness, terms 
of trade (TOT) variability, external debt, and financial depth. 
Similar to the measurement of inflation variability, nominal and real effective exchange 
rate variability is calculated by the standard deviation of their five-year rolling average. 
Fiscal position and current account position are measured as their surplus (+)/deficit (–) 
percentages of nominal GDP, thus these two variables are positive if in surplus and negative if in 
deficit. Trade openness is proxied by the ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services to 
nominal GDP.  
External debt is measured as the ratio of each country’s external debt position to GDP. The 
data for developing countries are drawn from the database of World Development Indicators; the 
data for industrial countries are constructed from the sum of stocks of portfolio investment debt 
securities and other investment liabilities under the international  investment position accounts in 
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. However, four countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Singapore, and Saudi Arabia) do not have international investment position data. Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (1999) provide a method to estimate the external debt for countries where stock 
data are not available. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, the external debt positions of these 
four countries are estimated by accumulating flows of portfolio investment debt securities and 
other investment liabilities under their balance of payment accounts in the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics, assuming their initial values of external debt are negligible.
4 
Financial depth is proxied by the ratio of M2 to nominal GDP, which represents the degree 
to which the economy is monetarized.
5 Accordingly, the larger the ratio, the greater the capacity 
monetary authorities have to implement monetary policy effectively. 
                                                 
4 Flows of portfolio investment debt securities and other investment liabilities are accumulated for these 
four countries since the year when their data are first available. Specifically, 1976 is the initial year for 
Greece, 1974 for Ireland, 1976 for Singapore, and 1971 for Saudi Arabia. 
5 Willamson and Mahar (1998) suggest that financial depth, measured by M2/GDP, is a helpful indicator to 
determine a financial system’s efficiency in mobilizing funds to foster economic growth.   6
TOT variability is calculated as the standard deviation of terms of trade index over the 
1980–2000 period.
6 Saudi Arabia is the only country that has no TOT data; thus its average oil 
export price variability is used instead, considering that oil is its major export commodity. 
It is worth noting that four economic structure variables, including trade openness, external 
debt, financial depth, and TOT variability, are fairly stable over the period. Given my interest in 
the underlying structure characteristics proxied by these four variables rather than in their small 
changes over time, I use the period average for 1980–2000 of each variable in the regression 
analysis. In this way, for a given country, any of the four variables only has one value over the 
period and functions like a pseudo-dummy variable. 
 
Economic Institution Variables 
Three institution indicators are most relevant to this inflation targeting study: whether inflation 
targeting is adopted, whether the central bank has autonomy, and whether a country has a floating 
exchange rate regime.  
Given this paper’s focus on inflation targeting, it is important to properly identify the 
inflation targeting countries and the dates of their adoption of inflation targeting. The literature 
provides us a variety of lists on these two variables, depending on the researchers’ different 
perspectives and interpretations of the inflation targeting framework. For example, Peru 
considered adopting inflation targeting in January 1993 as pointed out in Kuttner and Posen 
(2001), in January 1994 as observed in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), but it was not 
regarded as an inflation targeter by the end of 2001 (IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
2001).  
Truman (2003) summarizes four principal elements that characterize an inflation targeting 
country: 1) adopting price stability as the formal goal of monetary policy, 2) articulating a 
numerical target or sequence of targets, 3) establishing a time horizon to reach the target, and 4) 
creating an evaluation system to review whether the target has been met. Based on these four 
elements and after extensive contacts with the relevant central banks, Truman identifies 22 
inflation targeting countries. Table 1 lists these countries as well as the dates when they adopted 
inflation targeting.  
Three countries?Chile, Mexico, and Israel?have two initiation dates for adopting 
inflation targeting because these countries started with a monetary framework of mixed targets at 
                                                 
6 Terms of trade index is calculated by the ratio of export prices to import prices (goods and services). It 
measures a nation’s welfare position, which improves when export prices rise faster or fall slower than 
import prices.   7
the earlier date then abandoned the mixed targets, and switched to full-fledged inflation 
targeting.
7 Specifically, Chile announced a mixed framework of inflation targeting and a crawling 
exchange rate regime in September 1990 then moved to a sole target of inflation in September 
1999. Israel implemented inflation targeting together with a widening exchange rate band in 
December 1991 then abandoned the exchange rate target in June 1997. Mexico started with a 
mixed regime of inflation and monetary targeting in January 1995 but completely implemented 
inflation targeting in January 2001. It took some years for these three countries to move from a 
mixed regime toward a sole inflation targeting framework. Thus, it is interesting to examine 
whether the results in the analysis are different when using alternative dates of adoption for these 
three countries.  
In summary, table 1 shows 22 inflation targeting countries by 2002, of which nine are 
industrial countries and 13 are emerging-market economies. New Zealand was the first country to 
adopt inflation targeting as its monetary framework in December 1989. Following New Zealand, 
six industrial countries became inflation targeters in the early 1990s. Finland and Spain gave up 
inflation targeting after they joined the European Monetary Union in January 1999. Most 
emerging-market economies have a fairly short history of full implementation of inflation 
targeting since the late 1990s. 
Central bank autonomy is thought to be associated with the capacity to implement anti-
inflation policies.
8 Many indicators can be issued to measure central bank autonomy, but the 
multi-faceted measures could cause severe problems of interpretation.
9 Thus I follow Kuttner and 
Posen (2001) to narrow down the focus to two aspects of the legal structure: 1) whether there are 
barriers to firing the central bank governor, and 2) whether the central bank is prevented from 
                                                 
7 Spain actually operated under a de facto mixed regime from January 1995 to December 1998. Spain 
adopted inflation targeting in January 1995 in the context of an increase in VAT and a concern about the 
passthrough to inflation. That passthrough was much less than expected, nevertheless the peseta came 
under downward pressure in March 1995 and was devalued within the widened bands of the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System. In the same formal sense, Finland operated under a de facto 
mixed regime from January 1995 onward, but it did not experience any conflict situation. 
8Note that the variable for central bank “autonomy” is used, not a variable for central bank “independence,” 
either instrument or goal independence. See the debate on the role of these two variables in the choice of a 
monetary framework in Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). 
9 There are a large number of indicators to measure central bank autonomy or independence. However, the 
reliability and usefulness of these indicators have been questioned, since the existing indicators differ 
substantially from each other, in terms of the criteria contained in the index, the interpretation and 
evaluation to these criteria, and the way in which the criteria are aggregated. Thus the choice of indicators 
could lead to very different results. (Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger 2001; Posen 1998; and Cukierman 
1992). However, it does not mean these indicators are uninformative; it implies that the application of 
indicators is needed to be supplemented by judgment. Cukierman (1992) argues that some indices are more 
proper for some purpose than for others. For example, the turnover rate for governors or members of the 
policy board is a good indicator for central bank autonomy.   8
purchasing government debt directly. The central bank is identified as in full autonomy if answers 
to both questions are yes and in partial autonomy if there is only one positive answer.
10 This 
variable is established using data provided in Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti 
(2002), Kuttner and Posen (2001) and an examination of other information on the mandates of 
central banks.
11  
Two standards are often used in classifying exchange rate regimes in the literature. A de 
jure classification is based on the country’s publicly stated policy as summarized in the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. A de facto classification 
is normally based on the observed behavior of exchange rates. Either classification has its 
advantages and disadvantages. The de jure classification captures central banks’ formal 
commitment but fails to control for any actual policy inconsistency; the de facto classification 
documents the actual movement of exchange rates but misses the structural features.  
In practice, data of both de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes are employed in the 
regression analysis in order to examine whether these two classifications are associated with 
differences in my results. Data on the de jure exchange rate regime are collected from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Exchange rate regimes 
from nine categories found in the IMF’s report are then reclassified into three categories: a 
floating exchange rate regime includes free floating and managed floating; an intermediate 
floating exchange rate regime includes basket pegging, crawling pegging, and band arrangements 
(ERM); and a fixed exchange rate regime includes hard pegging and a currency board.
12  
In terms of the de facto exchange rate regime, the classification by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) is applied. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger categorize exchange rate regimes 
based on changes in a country’s nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes, and the 
volatility of international reserves. Their three-way classification divides observations into 
floating, intermediate floating, and fixed regimes, which are consistent with this paper’s de jure 
classification. 
Comparing the de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes, it seems developed countries 
often announce their flexible exchange rate regimes and are identified as such in de facto 
classification. Emerging-market economies tend to have different de jure and de facto exchange 
                                                 
10 This paper focuses on the effects of central bank autonomy on the choice of inflation targeting rather than 
whether the degree of autonomy causes differences in the results. Accordingly, the value 1 is assigned to 
the dummy for central bank autonomy if the central bank is in full autonomy, and 0 otherwise.  
11 For countries without previously codified central bank autonomy data, Truman used these sources such 
as mandates to make a judgment, applying his intuition and expertise. 
12 Applying the similar reason used for the variable for central bank autonomy, the value 1 is assigned to 
the dummy for floating exchange rate regime if it is free or managed floating, and 0 otherwise.    9
rate regimes, particularly in the face of pressure. As a whole, the two classifications are quite 
different with a low correlation of 0.38.
13  
In regressions in this paper, these three institution variables—inflation targeting, full 
central bank autonomy, and a floating exchange rate regime—take the value 1 in the year in 
which these regimes are adopted, and the value 0 otherwise. This paper follows the “half-year-
rule” to decide the policy regime of the year, if the data are monthly. When a regime is adopted in 
the first half of a year, that year is taken as the year of adoption; when a regime is adopted in the 
second half of a year, the year after is taken as the adoption year.  
 
III. METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS   
This section investigates two issues about inflation targeting. First, it examines factors associated 
with a country’s decision to adopt inflation targeting as its monetary framework. Second, it 
studies whether inflation targeting makes a difference to inflation, output, and the trade-off 
between inflation and output variability. 
In each case, the section describes the methodology employed, reports empirical results, 
and ends with a short summary. Given that we do not have a long time series for a large number 
of inflation targeting countries, it is unreasonable to expect robust results. 
 
Factors Associated with a Country’s Choice of Inflation Targeting 
The three principal questions are: (1) Which factors are systematically associated with a country’s 
choice of inflation targeting as its monetary framework? (2) Are there particularly significant 
factors? (3) What is the direction of any prominent influence? These questions are examined 
using my 66-country sample over the 1980–2000 period.  
 
Methodology 
In the absence of a compelling theory that models the choice of inflation targeting thus far, I 
choose, based on my intuition and the literature on this issue, 17 variables as potentially the most 
relevant factors associated with a country’s decision on inflation targeting.
14 I use logit 
regressions, in which the dependent variable takes the value 1 in one year before the inflation 
targeting adoption year decided by the “half-year-rule.”
15 Once a country adopts inflation 
                                                 
13 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) for a similar discussion.  
14 Inflation variability is not included in the regression, since it is highly correlated with inflation rate. 
15 This rule was set because the economic conditions in the year before adoption were thought to be the 
most relevant for the authority in making the choice of inflation targeting. Under the rule, when inflation 
targeting was adopted in the second half of a year, the dependent variable of that year was assigned the   10
targeting, it is dropped out of the sample, since I am interested in the preconditions for adopting 
inflation targeting rather than the features of inflation targeters. 
Both annual and three-year moving average data for nondummy variables are used in the 
regression to find out whether the authorities likely make their policy decision taking into account 
the accumulation of economic experience over several years. 
The regression exercises start with a “full” regression with a large set of independent 
variables covering seven economic conditions variables, eight economic structure variables, and 
two economic institution variables. The full regression is expected to give an overview of the 
influence of all relevant variables on the choice of inflation targeting. In most cases, those 
independent variables are then eliminated if they are not significant or do not have the “correct” 
signs as expected, and only significant variables in the “final” regressions are finally left.
16 The 




The regression results are shown in table 2.
17 The results using the three-year moving average 
data generate a slightly better overall fit than those using the annual data, based on the value of 
pseudo R-squared. It implies that the authorities are more likely to make a decision to adopt 
inflation targeting taking into account the accumulation of economic experience over several 
years. In the full regression, nine out of 14 variables have the expected signs using the moving 
average data, while 10 out of 14 variables have the expected signs using the annual data. When 
the larger dataset is reduced in the final regression, five factors stand out using the moving 
average data, while four remain significant using the annual data. The coefficients are discussed 
in table 2. 
Real GDP growth and the GDP gap were expected to be negatively associated with the 
choice of inflation targeting, since high GDP growth and a positive GDP gap reflect a success in 
current macroeconomic policies, thus there is little incentive for the authority to introduce a new 
inflation targeting framework. On the other hand, larger GDP variability would be associated 
with dissatisfaction with policy; this should contribute positively to the inflation targeting choice. 
As shown in the regression, real GDP growth and the GDP gap have the expected negative sign, 
                                                                                                                                                 
value 1; when inflation targeting was adopted in the first half of a year, the dependent variable of the year 
before was assigned the value 1. 
16 The rule is not applied to two variables?real GDP growth and inflation rate?which are established to 
capture main economic performance. That is, these two variables will be kept in the final regressions no 
matter what their significance and signs are. 
17 The number in parentheses in all tables is the standard error of the coefficient.   11
but the coefficient on real GDP variability does not have the expected positive sign. None of the 
coefficients is significant in the full regression; however, the coefficient on real GDP growth 
becomes significant at the 5 percent level in the final regression. 
I expected that the higher the inflation rate, the more likely that the authority would adopt 
an inflation targeting framework to bring inflation down. The coefficient on the inflation rate has 
the expected positive sign in the full regression using the annual data; however, its sign is 
negative when using the moving average data. Further, this coefficient becomes significantly 
negative in the final regressions using both the annual and the moving average data.  
Although it is quite an unexpected result, it does tell us something. It implies that the 
monetary authorities generally choose inflation targeting to maintain their already low inflation 
rates or to converge to a lower rate, rather than to squeeze very high inflation rates down. Truman 
(2003) identifies these three types of inflation targeting countries as “maintainers,” “convergers,” 
and “squeezers,” respectively.
18 As presented in the third column in table 1, 19 out of 22 inflation 
targeting countries are either “maintainers” or “convergers” at the time of full–fledged inflation 
targeting. Even the inflation rates of the remaining three “squeezers” (Colombia, Israel, and 
Poland) were very close to 10 percent at the time of adoption. 
The reason for adopting inflation targeting at a low inflation rate comes, perhaps, from a 
concern about central bank credibility. In fear of losing public credibility, the central banks might 
be inclined to adopt inflation targeting only when inflation rates are low, which makes their 
targeted inflation easier to reach or maintain. 
I anticipated that high nominal and real short–term interest rates might contribute 
positively to the choice of inflation targeting. On the one hand, high interest rates reflect 
dissatisfaction with the current economic performance, which motivates the authority to adopt a 
new inflation targeting framework. On the other hand, high interest rates raise the level of 
expected inflation, which might jeopardize public confidence on the central bank’s ability to 
control inflation. Therefore, the central bank is inclined toward adopting inflation targeting to 
achieve a low inflation rate and restore public credibility. As shown in the regression, this is not 
the case for the nominal interest rate; the real interest rate has the significant positive signs as 
expected. 
Foreign exchange pressure was expected to be positively associated with the choice of 
inflation targeting, as a number of countries adopted inflation targeting during or in the aftermath 
                                                 
18 According to Truman’s (2003) classification, maintainers’ inflation rates are less than 5 percent but 
above zero, convergers’ inflation rates are more than 5 percent but less than 10 percent, and squeezers’ 
inflation rates are 10 percent or higher.   12
of financial crises. The regression result supports my prior: the coefficient on foreign exchange 
pressure is significantly positive in all regressions.
19 
The influence of nominal and real effective exchange rate variability on the choice of 
inflation targeting is unclear. On the one hand, high exchange rate variability might be associated 
with dissatisfaction with current economic performance and a high level of expected inflation, 
thus contributing positively to the choice of inflation targeting; on the other hand, it might reflect 
a tough position for the authority to control inflation, therefore contributing negatively to the 
choice of inflation targeting. In the regressions, the coefficients of these two variables are not 
significant, and signs vary with different specifications. Accordingly, these two variables are 
dropped from the final regressions. 
A strong fiscal position was expected to be helpful for the monetary authority in adopting 
the inflation targeting framework. If a country is not fiscally sound, it is very likely the 
government might pressure the central bank to finance a large deficit by encouraging 
expansionary monetary policy, which could lead to a failure to meet the targeted inflation. This 
prior is confirmed by the regression using the moving average data: the coefficient on fiscal 
position is significantly positive.
20 However, it is not a strong case when using the annual data. 
Overall, it is reasonable to argue that a country needs to ensure its control of the fiscal situation, if 
not be in a very sound position, before adopting inflation targeting as its monetary framework. 
The current account position variable was expected to have a positive sign, applying a 
similar argument as used for the fiscal position variable. However, its coefficient has the wrong 
sign and is not significant in the full regressions. Thus it was taken out after the first-round 
experiment. 
A negative sign was expected on the trade openness variable, since it becomes more 
difficult for the authority to have an effective monetary policy with a higher degree of openness. 
However, its sign was the opposite of what was expected, and it is insignificant in the regressions.  
A negative sign was also anticipated on terms of trade variability, derived from the same 
argument for trade openness. The results show a correct sign on this variable, but the coefficient 
is insignificant. 
External debt could have mixed effects on the choice of inflation targeting. On the one 
hand, it proxies a country’s financial openness. The more open a country is, the harder it is for the 
central bank to implement monetary policy effectively, and thus external debt contributes 
                                                 
19 The coefficient of foreign exchange pressure turns out to be insignificant when the later dates for 
inflation targeting are applied. This result is discussed in detail later. 
20 This result is consistent with the finding by Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) based on a much 
smaller sample of countries.   13
negatively to the choice of inflation targeting. On the other hand, a high level of external debt 
might be associated with dissatisfaction with economic policy and therefore leads to an incentive 
to adopt inflation targeting. Taken together, it is hard to anticipate the direction of the combined 
effects. According to the empirical results, the sign of external debt is negative and significant in 
the full regressions but turns out to be insignificant in later regressions, so it is dropped in the 
final regressions. 
Financial depth represents the degree to which the economy is monetarized. Greater 
financial depth gives the authority more capacity to implement monetary policy effectively. As 
shown in regressions, the sign of financial depth is positive, as expected, but not significant. 
There are two economic institution variables in the regressions: central bank autonomy and 
floating exchange rate regime. Both variables were expected to be positively associated with the 
choice of inflation targeting. 
The central bank should have the institutional capacity to implement its monetary policy 
with little outside intervention, which requires a substantial degree of autonomy if not full 
independence. The central bank variable is positive but insignificant in the full regressions.  
A need for flexibility was expected when adopting inflation targeting, though not 
necessarily all the way to a free floating exchange rate regime.
21 A country’s exchange rate target 
should be subordinated to its inflation target because inflation targeting is incompatible with a 
rigid exchange rate regime. The de facto floating exchange rate regime was used in the full 
regressions and its coefficient was positive, as expected, but insignificant.    
The variable for the de jure floating exchange rate regime was then tried, and the 
regression was re-run using the moving average data. As shown in the last column in table 2, the 
result in the final regression indicates that the variable for the de jure floating exchange rate 
regime has the wrong sign and is insignificant. Other coefficients are unaffected.  
As discussed in section 2, the de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes match poorly 
with each other. The difference between the two classifications might cause the sign of the 
coefficient on the floating exchange rate regime to flip from positive using de facto floating to 
negative using de jure floating. Neither coefficient was expected to be persuasive, since both 
classifications are insignificant in the regressions. 
The later dates for inflation targeting were then used, and the regression was re-run using 
the moving average and de facto data (table 3).
22 In this new regression, the effect of the foreign 
                                                 
21 See a similar argument in Amato and Gerlach (2002). 
22 To compare the new result applying later dates for inflation targeting with the previous ones, the variable 
for fiscal position was included in the final regression, though it was not significant in the full regression.   14
exchange pressure variable is no longer evident but that of the de facto floating exchange rate 
regime variable becomes significant. This is because all three countries having two adoption dates 
relieved the foreign exchange pressure and adopted the floating exchange rate regimes at later 
dates. All other variables are unaffected.  
In comparison with the significant coefficient for a de facto exchange rate regime, the 
variable for a de jure exchange rate regime remains negative and insignificant when using the 
later date in the regression (table 3). Based on the regression results, it seems that the variable for 
the de facto floating exchange rate regime is a better indicator for describing the choice of 
inflation targeting, notably using the later dates of adoption. 
The robustness of the coefficients was further tested by eliminating observations in the 
year with inflation rates of more than 50 percent (table 4). The results are similar to those 
presented in table 2. 
No country adopted inflation targeting in the early and mid-1980s. It is reasonable to 
question whether the regression results are different when a shorter period of 1985–2000 is used. 
These experiments suggested that the results remained unaffected, except that it eliminated the 
significance of the coefficient for the fiscal position variable (table 4). 
The last two sets of regressions were also rerun—deleting observations with high inflation 
rates or using a shorter sample period, but using the later dates for inflation targeting. 
Significance was again found in the de facto floating exchange rate regime and insignificance in 
foreign exchange pressure. All other coefficients are unaffected. 
 
Summary 
The empirical investigations of the choice of inflation targeting are informative and encouraging. 
Most variables in regressions have the expected signs. Furthermore, a number of economic 
conditions, structure, and institution variables are found to be systematically associated with the 
choice of inflation targeting. 
GDP growth and real interest rates are strongly associated with a country’s choice of 
inflation targeting. The negative sign of GDP growth and the positive sign of real interest rates 
are consistent with the view that one motivation for adopting inflation targeting is to improve 
overall economic performance. 
The evidently negative impact of high inflation on the choice of inflation targeting was 
unexpected. The reason for the authority to adopt inflation targeting at the low rate might come 
from the concern about credibility. In fear of losing public credibility, the central bank is likely to   15
adopt inflation targeting when inflation rates are low, which makes its targeted inflation easier to 
fulfill. 
Foreign exchange pressure is positively associated with the choice of inflation targeting. 
But this coefficient is no longer significant when using later dates for the adoption of inflation 
targeting. In contrast, a de facto floating exchange rate regime is positive but insignificant in the 
regressions using early dates, but it turns out to be evident when using later dates. This is because 
all three countries, having two adoption dates, have relieved the foreign exchange pressure and 
adopted the floating exchange rate regime by the later dates. 
A de facto floating exchange rate regime seems a better indicator in describing the choice 
of inflation targeting than a de jure floating exchange rate regime. The variable for the de facto 
floating exchange rate regime has the “correct” signs in all regressions, and its coefficient is 
significant when using later dates for inflation targeting, while the variable of the de jure floating 
exchange rate regime has the wrong sign and is insignificant in all regressions.  
A sound fiscal position benefits the authority when adopting the inflation targeting 
framework. Its effect on the choice of inflation targeting is significant using the moving average 
data. 
 
Does Inflation Targeting Matter? 
A large literature has found that inflation targeting improves the performance of inflation and 
output and improves inflation forecasting by lowering the expected level of inflation and/or 
increasing its predictability. On the other hand, an almost equal number of studies claim not to 
find clear evidence to support the benefits of inflation targeting, though their results do not 
provide arguments against inflation targeting either.  
This section discusses the effects of inflation targeting by comparing the performance of 
inflation targeters and nontargeters in this paper’s sample. It first analyzes the changes in inflation 
and output in two descriptive tables and examines the trade-off between inflation and output 
variability in a set of simple regressions, then further explores the effects of inflation targeting by 
a set of regressions. 
 
Changes in Inflation and Output 
The averages of inflation and its variability and the averages of output and its variability are 
calculated for the inflation targeter and nontargeter groups across different sample periods, and 
then the two group means are analyzed in descriptive tables.    16
The effects of inflation targeting are further examined by applying the independent 
sampling method for small-sample inferences about the difference between two population means 




To better study the effects of inflation targeting, the dataset should be further processed in two 
steps. First, it is difficult to distinguish the performance of inflation and output in the pre- and 
post-targeting periods if a country has too short a time period after implementing its inflation 
targeting framework. Thus only those inflation targeters with more than four years of experience 
by the end of 2000 are kept. The rest of the inflation targeters are excluded from the sample to 
avoid its “contamination.” As a result, 14 inflation targeting countries are excluded from the 
sample after the first step of data processing. Second, “outliers” with very high inflation rates 
could distort the empirical results. Thus those countries with average inflation above 50 percent 
during 1985–2000 are eliminated. Countries with inflation above 50 percent in any year from 
1989 to 1994 are also excluded. Consequently, another 15 noninflation targeting countries are 
dropped out of the sample. 
In sum, the paper’s sample is left with 37 countries, of which eight are inflation targeters 
and 29 are nontargeters. The eight inflation targeting countries are Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom?seven of them are 
industrialized countries, according to the classification of industrial countries found in the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics, and 13 industrial countries are in the nontargeter group. 
  For these eight inflation-targeting countries, I compute the standard deviation of inflation 
and output and the average of inflation and output growth from 1985 until the year before they 
adopt inflation targeting and from the year they become inflation targeters until 2000. For the 29 
nontargeters?the control group?the same four variables are calculated for two averages: the 
average between 1985 and 1994 and the average between 1995 and 2000.
23 Descriptive statistics 
show improvement on inflation and output in both inflation targeter and nontargeter groups.  
The effects of inflation targeting are further examined applying the independent sampling 
method for small–sample inferences about the difference between two population means.
24 It is 
reasonable to expect that inflation reduction for the inflation targeter group will be larger than 
                                                 
23 The rationale is that all inflation targeters left in the sample had adopted inflation targeting by 1995. 
24 This test requires to assume both sample populations are approximately normal distributed with equal 
population variance.    17
that for the nontargeter group, if inflation targeting plays a role in driving inflation rates down. 
Taking the level of inflation as an example, I first calculate the difference between post- and pre-
target periods for inflation targeting countries and the difference between the 1995–2000 and the 
1985–94 periods for nontargeting countries. Assuming normality and equal variance for the series 
of inflation difference in this sampling project,
25 a pooled sample estimator is constructed. Thus, 
if 
2
1 s and 
2
2 s  are the variances for the series of inflation difference in the inflation-targeter and 
nontargeter groups, respectively, the pooled sample estimator of the variance 
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The rejection region of this t-test is two-tailed with ( 1 n + 2 n –2) degree of freedom.  
Two caveats of this method should be kept in mind. First, the t-test is based on two strong 
assumptions (normality and equal variance). It is hard to examine these assumptions, making my 
results less convincing. Second, it cannot solve the “regression-to-the mean” problem put forward 
by Ball and Sheridan (2003). They argue that compared with the nontargeters, the inflation 
targeters generally move from a higher level of inflation rates to a lower level, which makes their 





                                                 
25 The t-test is invalid if either assumption is not satisfied.   18
Results 
Descriptive results for eight inflation targeting countries and the average statistics of control 
groups are displayed in tables 5 and 6. Let us first take a look at inflation and its variability in 
table 5. 
Each inflation targeter lowers its inflation rate as well as variability from the pre– to the 
post–targeting periods. Their average inflation rate declines from 8.3 to 3.1 percent, and inflation 
variability declines from 3.5 to 2.1 percent. A similar trend is found in the control groups. Taking 
the 29 nontargeters as a whole, their inflation rate and variability decrease from 7.5 to 4.7 percent 
and from 2.7 to 1.8 percent, respectively. 
  Inflation and variability for industrial countries are further compared in the sample. In 
this exercise, the level of inflation drops from 6.4 to 2.1 percent for inflation targeters, and from 
4.7 to 2.2 percent for nontargeters; while the variability of inflation falls from 2.3 to 1.5 percent 
for inflation targeters, and from 1.9 to 1.1 percent for nontargeters.  
  It is hard to single out the effects of inflation targeting because inflation and its variability 
in both the inflation targeter and the nontargeter groups move downward. However, the inflation 
rate of the inflation targeters moves from a level higher than that of nontargeters to a level lower 
than that of nontargeters, for both the 37-country and industrial -country-only cases.
26 This 
suggests that the inflation targeting framework might promote weakly performing countries to 
“converge” to those countries performing better already.
27  
  Output performance of the inflation targeting countries is then compared with those of 
the control groups (table 6). For the inflation targeter group, the average output growth increases 
from 2.9 to 3.6 percent while variability decreases from 2 to 1.6 percent. On the other hand, for 
the noninflation targeting countries, output growth remains nearly unchanged but is still higher 
than that of inflation targeters, and the variability drops from 2 to 1.7 percent. Similar results are 
observed in the sub-sample of industrial countries. The output growth rises from 2.4 to 3.1 
percent for inflation targeters and from 2.7 to 3.2 percent for nontargeters, while the variability 
falls from 2 to 1.4 percent for inflation targeters and from 1.5 to 1.3 percent for nontargeters.  
                                                 
26 Ball and Sheridan (2003) have similar findings on performance inflation and output comparing inflation 
targeters and nontargeters based on 20 industrial countries. However, they argue these results are biased by 
regression to the mean. The beneficial effects of inflation targeting are no longer significant when they 
control for the initial value of the variables. 
27 As Neumann and von Hagen (2002) suggested, inflation targeting promotes poorly performing countries 
to converge to those already doing well.   19
Based on descriptive statistics, one cannot tell whether inflation targeting plays a role 
beneficial to higher output growth and lower output variability,
28 since output performance 
improves in both groups.  
  Next, the small-sample method is used for the difference between two population means 
to further examine the effects of inflation targeting. As presented in table 7, using the 37-country 
sample, the magnitude of inflation reduction and real GDP growth rise in the inflation targeter 
group is significantly larger than that in the nontargeter group, while the nontargeter group brings 
down inflation variability further than the inflation targeter group does. Results are similar when 
using the industrial-country-only sample, except for some changes in the significance of the t-test. 
It shows that inflation targeters perform significantly better in reducing inflation rates and GDP 
variability. Taken together, the inflation targeter group lowers inflation rates much more than the 
nontargeter group does in both samples.  
In summary, the performance of inflation and output improves for both inflation targeters 
and nontargeters. Inflation targeting countries function notably well in lowering inflation rates, 
which might imply that the inflation targeting framework promotes weakly performing countries 
to “converge” to those countries performing better already. However, more careful studies are 
required to make a generalized argument that inflation targeting is beneficial to inflation and 
output. This issue is further discussed using a regression framework in the latter part of this 
section. 
 
The Trade-off Between Inflation and Output Variability 
Both inflation and output variability are reduced for the sample countries shown in tables 5 and 6. 
This result is different from the view of the Taylor Curve (Taylor 1979). Taylor points out that 
there exists a trade-off between inflation and output variability, thus policymakers have to face 
the choice of lowering the inflation variability at the expense of higher output variability or 
lowering the output variability at the cost of higher inflation variability. In other words, a low 
inflation policy implies the choice of a different point along the trade-off frontier between 
inflation and output variability. 
 However, this paper’s descriptive statistics suggest that a reduction in inflation and its 
variability could enhance output performance by increasing the growth while decreasing its 
variability. It might suggest that the frontier presenting the trade-off between inflation and output 
                                                 
28 Empirical findings are mixed. Some economists suggest that inflation targeting stabilizes inflation and 
output. Others, such as Cecchetti and Ehrmann (1999), argue that inflation targeting increases output 
variability.   20
variability along the Taylor Curve shifts toward the origin, which consequently lowers both 
inflation and output variability. 
Thus one might wonder what happens to the trade-off between inflation and output 
variability in practice. Does inflation targeting improve the performance of inflation as well as 
output? This section attempts to investigate these questions by applying this paper’s sample of 37 
countries.
29 Dependent variables are output variability, inflation variability, or the ratio of output 
variability to inflation variability. Because of the limited number of observations, it is not 
possible to include a large number of control variables in the regression, thus only inflation rates 
and growth rates are used. Regressions are run in logarithms for all nondummy variables, since 
they provide slightly better, but similar, results to those using a level regression.  
 
Results 
The regression results are presented in table 8. In the first three columns of the top table, 
dependent and independent variables are in the form of a ratio of the observations during the post- 
and pre-targeting periods. In the fourth column, regressions are run separately for the pre- and 
post-targeting periods, and thus the sample size is doubled.  
The coefficient on inflation targeting is significantly positive in the regression with 
inflation variability as the dependent variable. This result is the opposite of my expectation that 
inflation targeting would lower inflation variability. And inflation targeting has negative effects 
on output variability, but they are not significant. With regard to control variables, only the 
negative association between output growth and inflation variability is significant.  
In the bottom table, regressions are run between inflation and output variability. The results 
show a significant positive relationship between inflation and output variability, which is 
different from the view of the Taylor Curve. Thus there might be an improved trade-off between 
two kinds of variability, but more data and a longer time series are needed to confirm this 
argument. On the other hand, inflation targeting lowers both the inflation and output variability in 
these two regressions, but neither effect is significant. 
 
Summary 
The empirical exercises convey three messages. First, there is an evident and positive relationship 
between inflation and output variability, which is inconsistent with the Taylor Curve. Thus there 
                                                 
29 Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) study this issue by comparing the average of output and inflation 
variability for inflation targeting countries in the pre- and post-targeting periods. They find a reduction in 
both variability, but at the same time, they point out that results need to be improved by using a control 
group of countries.   21
might be an improved trade-off between two kinds of variability, but more data and a longer time 
series are needed to make a strong argument. Second, I find limited support for the proposition 
that the adoption of inflation targeting improves the trade-off between inflation and output 
variability. The improvement on both inflation and output variability reflects that the1990s was a 
low inflation and stable output growth period for most countries. Third, the adoption of inflation 
targeting evidently lowers the inflation rate, and its effect on inflation variability is mixed.
30  
 
The Influence of Inflation Targeting on the Level of Inflation and Output 
To further detect the influence of inflation targeting, the level and variability of inflation and 
output are used as the dependent variables respectively and four sets of regressions are run on 
factors associated with the dependent variables including whether the country is an inflation 
targeter.
31  
I again start with a “full” regression with a large set of independent variables,
32 then 
gradually drop those independent variables if they are not significant or do not have “correct” 
signs as expected, until only prominent factors are contained in the “final” regression.  
I first try the regression using data of 66 sample countries initially for the 1980-2000 
period, but find that “outliers” with a very high inflation rate distort the regression results to some 
extent.
33 In order to eliminate the influence of these “outliers,” those countries with an average 
inflation rate above 25 percent during 1980-2000 are dropped from the sample. Fifteen countries 
are thus eliminated. They are five inflation targeters (Brazil, Israel, Mexico, Peru, and Poland) 
and 10 potential inflation targeters (Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Nigeria, Romania, 
Turkey, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Regressions are then run for the remaining 51 






                                                 
30 Nadal De-Simone (2001) studied a similar question and obtained similar results as well. 
31 There may not be firm priors for a few variables in the regressions, since this paper’s principal interest is 
the dummy for inflation targeting. 
32 The list of independent variables is refined in tables 2 to 4, since some variables, such as lagged money 
growth, belong in these regressions but are to appropriate to a country’s decision to adopt inflation 
targeting; and some variables are interpreted in a different way in these regressions. 
33 For example, in the regression with the level of inflation as dependent variable, the value of R-squared 
improves and more coefficients become significant when deleting these “outliers.”   22
Results 
I first examine the effect of inflation targeting on inflation and its variability controlling effect of 
any trend in the data.
34 Both “full” and “final” regression results are presented in table 9. 
With respect to the level of inflation, the results shown in the three left-hand-side columns 
are gratifying in terms of overall fit and the number of coefficients that are significant.  
I first look at the six independent variables listed at the top of table 9, which are used to 
capture the traditional macroeconomic determinants of inflation. As expected, lagged money 
growth has a significant positive effect on inflation. On the other hand, it is surprising to find that 
the influence of the real GDP gap is not only negative but also marginally significant, which is 
inconsistent with the positive correlation between output and inflation along the short-run Phillips 
Curve. One possible explanation is that, even though money growth with a one-period lag is 
included, the regressions pick up a “classical” relationship: faster money growth that does not 
show up in faster growth shows up with a lag in higher inflation.  
The coefficients for real GDP variability and the percentage change in nonfuel commodity 
prices have the expected sign with respect to real GDP variability but not with respect to 
commodity prices, but in both cases they are insignificant.
35 Nevertheless, I retained these two 
variables in the final regression to be sure to capture the basic inflation process. 
 Fiscal position has the expected negative sign but the effect is not significant, so this 
variable is excluded in the final regression.
36 On the other hand, financial depth is significantly 
and negatively associated with inflation as expected, which again supports the view that greater 
financial depth provides the economy more capacity to bring down inflation.
37 
Turning to the two economic institution variables, it is most impressive to find the 
significantly negative coefficient of inflation targeting.
38 The beneficial effect of inflation 
                                                 
34 Annual dummies help to control for any bias in the regression to the mean. Although the year dummies 
in general are not significant, their inclusion improved the overall fit of the regressions and affected the 
significance of some of coefficients. 
35 Contrary to the measurement of real GDP growth variability in the regressions exploring the choice of 
inflation targeting, this variable is estimated for these regressions by the standard deviation of five-year 
rolling average of real GDP growth. The percentage change in petroleum prices were also tried in the 
regressions, and the coefficients were found to be less precise than those for nonfuel commodity prices. 
36 This finding is broadly consistent with that in Catão and Terrones (2003). They find that fiscal deficit is 
significantly and positively associated with high inflation in high inflation countries and countries with 
underdeveloped financial markets.  
37 Khan and Senhadji (2001) also find a negative correlation between inflation and financial depth. 
38 Ball and Sheridan (2003) examine the effect of inflation targeting for industrial countries comparing pre- 
and post-targeting data. They find a significant and negative association between inflation targeting and 
inflation rates. However, they argue that the result reflects regression to the mean, since the beneficial 
effect of inflation targeting is no longer significant when they control for the inflation rate in the pre-
targeting period. Regressions in this paper include annual dummies in order to control for this possible bias 
but still find the negative impact of inflation targeting on inflation is robust.   23
targeting is quite large: it can reduce the inflation rate by 2.5 percent on average. The negative 
influence on the level of inflation remains significant when the regression is run using the de jure 
exchange rate regime or/and the later date of inflation targeting for Chile.
39 This supports the 
paper’s findings in the descriptive statistics that inflation targeting is associated with a reduction 
in inflation rates. 
The coefficient on the central bank autonomy is significant and negative, with an impact on 
inflation rate of almost two percentage points on average. The negative effect also remains robust 
when the dummy variable is used for a de jure exchange rate regime or/and the later date for 
inflation targeting. 
Turning to the final eight variables listed at the bottom of the table, they can be viewed as 
summarizing the external environment for a country. The results do not offer too much support 
for the view that external factors have strong adverse influence on inflation performance, and thus 
countries should avoid inflation targeting if they face a hostile external environment.  
The variable for trade openness has a significantly negative impact on inflation, which is 
contrary to my expectation that the more open an economy is, the more vulnerable it is to the 
external shocks, thus the higher inflation is. An alternative view by Romer (1993) and Lane 
(1995) may explain this result—monetary policy is more constrained to follow a time-consistent 
framework with a resulting lower inflation rate in a more open economy. On the other hand, 
terms of trade variability has the expected and significant positive effect in the full regression, but 
the sign turns to negative but insignificant in the final regression. 
The coefficient on a de facto exchange rate regime is positive as expected, and it is 
significant at the 10 percent level.
40 Foreign exchange pressure is positive but insignificant, so it 
was dropped in the final regression. 
Real and nominal effective exchange rate variability, reflecting fluctuations in the policies 
and performance of the internal as well as the external economy, might bring instability to prices 
and push up inflation and its variability. Therefore, as expected, both variables are positively and 
significantly associated with inflation in the full regression, but only the variability of nominal 
exchange rate shows up as significant in the final regression. 
                                                 
39 Israel and Mexico, two other countries with early and later dates for the adoption of inflation targeting, 
were eliminated from the regression since their average inflation rates during the 1980–2000 period were 
more than 25 percent. 
40 When regressions are run using the dummy variable for a de jure exchange rate regime, the coefficient is 
negative in the full regression and positive in the final regression but neither is significant. This illustrates 
the sensitivity of results from this type of exercise to the specification of this variable.    24
The variable for a country’s current account position is negative and the variable for 
external debt is positive in their influence on inflation, but both variables are insignificant, thus 
they were dropped in the final regression. 
The results for the variability of inflation, shown in the three right-hand-side columns of 
table 9, are arguably more relevant than the results for the level of inflation to the issue of 
whether inflation targeting as a monetary policy framework suits a country’s economic 
characteristics. It is because people might argue for a wider target range with a higher midpoint, 
or perhaps against inflation targeting, if inflation is very volatile or hard to predict or control.
41 
Compared with the regressions with the level of inflation as the dependent variable, the 
regressions for the variability of inflation have much lower overall fits and fewer variables with 
significance.  
With respect to macroeconomic determinants of inflation variability, only lagged money 
growth and financial depth have the expected signs and are significant in both the full and final 
regressions. On the other hand, the real GDP growth gap again has the unexpected negative sign 
and is marginally significant in the final regression. GDP growth variability is positively 
associated with inflation variability, which is inconsistent with the presumption of a trade-off 
along the Taylor Curve but is similar to my findings in examining the trade-off between inflation 
and output variability. And nonfuel commodity prices have an unexpected negative sign and are 
significant in the full regression but lose significance in the final regression. 
The coefficients of inflation targeting are negative as expected, but not significant in this 
case. The results for central bank autonomy are similar. 
With respect to eight variables representing the external environment, the variability of 
nominal exchange rates stands out as having expected and significant effects on inflation 
variability. On the other hand, the variable for de facto floating is significant but negative in both 
regressions.
42 Trade openness is associated with lower inflation variability, and the effect is 
significant in the final regression. The rest of the variables contribute little to the overall story.  
A parallel set of regressions is then run for the level and variability of output (real GDP). I 
did not have firm priors for many of the variables and was somewhat less systematic in moving 
from the full to final regressions, since my principal interest is the dummy variable for inflation 
targeting. The results are shown in table 10.  
                                                 
41 See the arguments found in Ito and Hayashi (2003) and Erceg (2002).  
42 The dummy variable for de jure floating was also tried, and it has the right sign (positive) but is 
insignificant.   25
With respect to the regressions for GDP growth, inflation targeting has a significant 
positive effect on output, adding more than half a percentage point to growth.
43 The impact of 
inflation targeting on output remains significant when employing the dummy variable for a de 
jure exchange rate regime. Output variability is significantly associated with growth in both 
regressions; while inflation variability has a negative association with growth, it is significant 
only in the full regression. The only external factor that has significant influence on growth is 
external debt in the full regression, but it loses its significance in the final regression.  
In the regressions for the variability of growth, inflation targeting is significantly 
associated with lower growth variability, contrary to my expectation and the prediction of some 
critics of inflation targeting that greater attention to inflation should show up in an increase in the 
variability of growth. The results suggest that an inflation targeting framework can not only help 
lower inflation but also improve the GDP performance. Central bank autonomy has a large and 
significant negative influence on growth variability as well.  
  
Summary 
The most impressive findings are that inflation targeting does play a significant role in lowering 
inflation, and the size of the effect is large. There is a similar favorable influence on inflation 
variability, but it is not significant. Inflation targeting also significantly improves GDP growth 
and lowers GDP growth variability. 
The influence of external environment variables on inflation and growth is limited, which 
differs from the view that countries vulnerable to the external environment should be wary about 
adopting inflation targeting. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper first studied factors that might be systematically associated with a country’s choice of 
inflation targeting as its monetary framework. It found that a number of economic condition, 
structure, and institution variables are systematically associated with a country’s decision to adopt 
inflation targeting.  
Low GDP growth and high real interest rates are significantly associated with the choice of 
inflation targeting, consistent with the view that one motivation for adopting inflation targeting is 
to improve overall economic performance. 
                                                 
43 Ball and Sheridan (2003) find a positive but insignificant result for industrial countries, but the beneficial 
effect of inflation targeting is washed out when they control for regression to the mean, as I do using annual 
dummies.   26
The evidently negative impact of inflation on the choice of inflation targeting was 
unexpected. The reason for the authorities’ reluctance to adopt inflation targeting at a high 
inflation rate might come from the concern about their credibility. In fear of losing public 
credibility, the central bank is more likely to adopt inflation targeting when inflation rates are 
low, which makes the targeted inflation rate easier to achieve. 
Several economic structure and institution variables?sound fiscal position, central bank 
autonomy, and a floating exchange rate regime?are found to be associated with the choice of 
inflation targeting under various regression specifications. They are desirable but not essential 
preconditions for inflation targeting. 
The paper then examines the effects of inflation targeting on the performance of inflation 
and output. The descriptive statistics indicate that the performance of inflation and output is 
improved for both inflation targeters and nontargeters. Inflation targeting countries function 
notably well in lowering inflation rates and raising output growth, which might weakly imply that 
the inflation targeting framework promotes performing countries to “converge” to those countries 
performing better already. The regression results reinforce the findings that inflation targeting 
does play a role in improving the level and variability of inflation and output; notably, it 
significantly improves the level of inflation and both the level and variability of output. However, 
more careful studies are required to make a strong argument that inflation targeting is beneficial 
to inflation and output compared with noninflation targeter frameworks, given that we have a 
fairly short history of inflation targeting and a limited number of inflation targeters on which to 
base my results to date. 
The paper also investigates the trade-off between inflation and output variability. There is 
an evident and positive relationship between inflation and output variability, which is different 
from the view based on the Taylor Curve. I do, however, find limited support for the proposition 
that the adoption of inflation targeting improves the trade-off between inflation and output 
variability. 
   27
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Real GDP growth C Real GDP growth (percent) IFS
Standard deviation of the average GDP growth for the period of 
1980–2000 (used in the regressions examining the choice of inflation 
targeting)
Standard deviation of 5-year rolling average of real GDP growth (used 
in the regressions examing the impact of inflation targeting on the 
performance of inflation and growth)
Real GDP gap C
Real GDP gap:  [(actual real GDP–potential real GDP)/potential real 
GDP] (percent)
Constructed based on 
IFS data
Inflation  C CPI (percent) IFS
Inflation variability C Standard deviation of 5-year rolling average of inflation  IFS
Nominal interest rate C Money market rate (percent) IFS
Real interest rate C [(1 + nominal interest rate)/(1 + inflation rate)] –1] (percent)




Weighted average of changes in  foreign exchange rate and reserves
Constructed based on 
KSS (2001), FRB, IFS 
data
M2 growth (lagged) C One-period lagged M2 growth (percent) GDF & WDI, IFS
Economic structure variables
Variability of REER  E
Standard deviation of 5-year rolling average of real effective exchange 
rate IFS
Variability of NEER E
Standard deviation of 5-year rolling average of nominal effective 
exchange rate IFS
Fiscal position E Government fiscal surplus/deficit as a percentage of nominal GDP IFS
Current account E Current account position as a percentage of nominal GDP GDF & WDI, IFS
Trade openness E
The average ratio of the sum of imports and exports of goods and 
services to GDP (1980–2000) GDF & WDI, IFS
Terms of trade variability E
The average of the standard deviation of terms of trade index 
(1980–2000) GDF & WDI
External debt E The average ratio of external debt to nominal GDP (1980–2000) GDF & WDI
Financial depth E The average ratio of M2 to nominal GDP (1980–2000) IFS
Economic institution variables
Inflation targeting I Adoption of inflation targeting Truman (2003)
Central bank autonomy I Central bank autonomy
Cukierman (1992, 
2002), K&P (2001)
De facto exchange rate regime LYS (2002)
De jure exchange rate regime IFS
Other variables
Non-fuel commodity prices C Annual change of world non-fuel commodity price index (percent)
Constructed based on 
IFS data
K&P = Kuttner and Posen
LYS = Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
IFS = IMF's International Financial Statistics
WDI = World Bank's World Development Indicators
GDF = World Bank's Global Development Finance
Floating exchange rate regime I
C
Constructed based on 
IFS data
Real GDP growth variabilityTable 1  The fact sheet of inflation targeting countries
De facto floating  De jure floating
Australia June 1993 0.99 2.09 1 1
Brazil June 1999 3.2 0.79 0 0
Canada Feb. 1991 4.77 -0.23 1 1
Early date: Sept. 1990 26.04 3.7 1 0
Late date: Sept. 1999 3.33 -0.98 1 0
Colombia Oct. 1999 11.22 -4.2 1 0
Czech Republic Dec. 1997 8.55 -0.76 1 1
Finland Feb. 1993 2.6 -3.32 0 0
Hungary June 2001 9.78 5.19 0 0
Iceland March 2001 5.16 5.47 0 0
Early date: Dec. 1991 19.02 6.24 0 0
Late date: June 1997 11.28 4.51 1 0
Korea April 1998 4.43 5.01 0 0
Early date: Jan. 1995 6.96 4.41 0 0
Late date: Jan. 2001 9.49 6.64 1 1
New Zealand Dec. 1989 7.49 0.23 0 1
Norway March 2001 3.09 2.7 0 0
Peru Jan. 2002 1.98 0.2 n.a n.a
Philippines Jan. 2002 6.12 3.4 n.a n.a
Poland Sept. 1998 11.73 4.84 1 0
South Africa Feb. 2000 5.18 2.12 1 1
Spain Jan. 1995 4.71 2.26 0 0
Sweden Jan. 1993 2.29 -1.43 0 0
Thailand May 2000 0.32 4.43 1 1
United                 
Kingdom Oct. 1992 3.73 0.23 1 0
* The value of economic variables are for one year before the inflation targeting adoption year decided by "half-year-rule".  
   According to the "half-year-rule", when a regime is adpoted in the first half of a year, that year is taken as the year of 













IsraelTable 2  Factors associated with countries' choice of inflation targeting














Real GDP growth  - -0.0988 -0.0987** -0.1882 -0.1978** -0.1826
(0.09) (0.042) (0.129) (0.089) (0.124)
GDP growth variability + -0.1411 -0.0967 -0.0943
(0.124) (0.075) (0.074)
Real GDP gap - -0.0584 -0.0705 -0.0757
(0.07) (0.065) (0.065)
Inflation rate  + 0.0136** -0.0634** -0.0269 -0.0482*** -0.0159
(0.007) (0.031) (0.033) (0.018) (0.035)
Nominal interest rate + -0.0501 -0.0100 -0.0121
(0.041) (0.007) (0.007)
Real interest rate + 0.1777*** 0.0011** 0.1609*** 0.0009** 0.1662***
(0.061) (0.001) (0.059) (0.0004) (0.057)
Foreign exchange pressure + 0.8382 0.9138* 1.0283* 0.9077* 0.9346*
(0.549) (0.49) (0.573) (0.492) (0.564)
REER variability ? 0.0046 -0.0028 -0.0029
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
NEER variability ? -0.0123 -0.0132 -0.0092
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Fiscal position  + 0.0232 0.185** 0.0987** 0.1916**
(0.075) (0.091) (0.042) (0.096)
Current account + -0.0383 -0.1271 -0.1178
(0.095) (0.079) (0.081)
Trade openness - 0.0017 0.0020 0.0017
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Terms of trade variability - -0.0393 -0.0171 -0.0283
(0.073) (0.063) (0.068)
External debt ? -0.0156** -0.0235* -0.0274**
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Financial depth + 0.0052 0.0087 0.0111
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Central bank full autonomy + 0.2770 0.4811 0.8065
(0.85) (0.886) (0.982)
Floating exchange rate  regime + 0.4498 0.2497
(de facto) (0.569) (0.538)
Floating exchange rate  regime -0.9066
(de jure) (0.684)
Constant -3.0927 -3.2248 -2.5533 -2.7046 -2.1139
Number of observations 994 1022 1008 1017 1009
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.20




Moving average data Annual data
De facto ERRTable 3   Factors associated with countries' choice of inflation targeting (using later dates of inflation targeting)
(Using moving average data in regressions)










Real GDP growth  - -0.2865*** -0.2889*** -0.2744*** -0.2593***
(0.097) (0.097) (0.104) (0.085)
GDP growth variability + 0.0719 0.0712
(0.079) (0.085)
Real GDP gap - 0.0219 -0.0001
(0.058) (0.061)
Inflation rate  + -0.0316 -0.0724*** -0.0427 -0.0643***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.053) (0.019)
Nominal interest rate + -0.0564 -0.0216
(0.047) (0.069)
Real interest rate + 0.2415** 0.0014*** 0.1887 0.0012***
(0.098) (0) (0.117) (0.0003)
Foreign exchange pressure + 0.1101 0.2732 0.1239 0.3743
(0.583) (0.517) (0.587) (0.524)
REER variability ? -0.0193 -0.0178
(0.02) (0.02)
NEER variability ? -0.000000183 -0.0228
(-1.83e-07) (0.018)
Fiscal position  + 0.0965 0.0985** 0.0990 0.0904**
(0.073) (0.043) (0.074) (0.044)
Current account + -0.0997 -0.1138
(0.069) (0.079)
Trade openness - 0.0042 0.0024
(0.005) (0.006)
Terms of trade variability - -0.0082 -0.0186
(0.063) (0.074)
External debt ? -0.0198* -0.0286***
(0.011) (0.011)
Financial depth + 0.0062 0.0106
(0.008) (0.009)
Central bank autonomy + -0.0446 -0.2566 0.1977
(0.737) (0.636) (0.85)
Floating exchange rate regime + 1.0637* 1.1908**
(de facto) (0.577) (0.473)
Floating exchange rate  regime -0.3314
(de jure) (0.636)
Constant -2.9322** -2.5748*** -1.8995 -2.3164***
Number of observations 1029 1036 1030 1038
Pseudo R-Squared 0.21 0.13 0.2 0.1
 *, ** and *** represent rejecting the null hypothesis of no significance at levels of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
Expected 
sign
Using later dates of inflation targeting
De facto ERR De jure ERRTable 4   Factors associated with countries' choice of inflation targeting (deleting years with inflation more 
                than 50 percent) 
(Using moving average data in regressions)


















Real GDP growth  - -0.1909 -0.2001** -0.1846 -0.365** -0.2196*** -0.3473**
 (0.131) (0.09)  (0.125) (0.148) (0.085) (0.139)
GDP growth variability + -0.1039 -0.101 -0.1232 -0.1231
(0.077) (0.076) (0.102) (0.11)
Real GDP gap - -0.072 -0.076 -0.0169 -0.0161
(0.065) (0.065) (0.074) (0.074)
Inflation rate  + -0.021 -0.0431** -0.014 -0.0185 -0.0392*** -0.0076
(0.034) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021) (0.015) (0.02)
Nominal interest rate + -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0173** -0.0195***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.008) (0.008)
Real interest rate + 0.0611*** 0.0042** 0.1646*** 0.2053*** 0.0007** 0.2113***
(0.055) (0.002) (0.054) (0.077) (0.002) (0.078)
Foreign exchange pressure + 1.0732* 0.9137* 0.974* 1.0991* 1.0046** 1.0147*
(0.571) (0.49) (0.555) (0.582) (0.493) (0.591)
REER variability ? -0.0048 -0.0052 0.0341** 0.0389**
(0.152) (0.15) (0.017) (0.018)
NEER variability ? -0.0117 -0.0078 -0.0053 -0.0014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.006)
Fiscal position  + 0.1862** 0.0996** 0.194** 0.1981* 0.0760 0.2089*
(0.091) (0.042) (0.091) (0.105) (0.048) (0.111)
Current account + -0.1178 -0.1082 -0.1735** -0.1656**
(0.079) (0.082) (0.077) (0.082)
Trade openness - 0.0021 0.0018 0.0058 0.0049
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
Terms of trade variability - -0.0220 -0.033 -0.0316 -0.0448
(0.064) (0.069) (0.07) (0.072)
External debt ? -0.0249** -0.0285** -0.0259** -0.0293**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Financial depth + 0.0096 0.0117 0.0092 0.0114
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Central bank autonomy + 0.524 0.836 0.4542 0.7588
(0.89) (0.98) (0.812) (0.887)
Floating exchange rate regime + 0.1971 0.3915
(de facto) (0.537) (0.559)
Floating exchange rate  regime -0.8868 -0.9466
(de jure) (0.670) (0.687)
Constant -2.617* -2.7395*** -2.1934** -2.4769** -2.5506*** -1.9730
Number of observations 899 907 900 786 794 786
Pseudo R-squared 0.17 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.09 0.24
 *, ** and *** represent rejecting the null hypothesis of no significance at levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent respectively.
De facto ERR
Expected 
sign De facto ERR
Deleting years with high inflation 
















Australia 6.33 2.25 -4.08 1.80 1.71 -0.09
Canada 4.38 2.00 -2.38 1.16 1.16 0.00
Chile 21.33 9.58 -11.75 6.16 3.88 -2.28
Finland 4.68 1.23 -3.45 1.92 1.28 -0.63
New Zealand 11.32 2.25 -9.07 4.74 2.00 -2.74
Spain 6.24 3.01 -3.23 1.68 1.30 -0.38
Sweden 6.27 1.46 -4.81 2.52 1.71 -0.81
United Kingdom 5.68 2.62 -3.06 2.00 1.23 -0.77
Data summary: All 37 countries
Average (8 inflation targeters) 8.28 3.05 -5.23 3.52 2.12 -1.41
Average (29 nontargeters)* 7.48 4.68 -2.79 2.75 1.78 -0.96
Industrial countries only
Average (7 inflation targeters) 6.41 2.12 -4.30 2.26 1.49 -0.78
Average (13 nontargeters)* 4.65 2.15 -2.51 1.91 1.05 -0.86
* = For nontargeters, the average between 1985 and 1994 and the average between 1995 and 2000 are compared.














Australia 3.03 4.46 1.43 1.70 1.04 -0.66
Canada 3.24 2.70 -0.54 1.59 1.55 -0.03
Chile 6.21 6.65 0.45 2.11 3.03 0.92
Finland 1.27 3.71 2.44 3.03 2.22 -0.81
New Zealand 2.72 2.39 -0.32 2.50 1.89 -0.61
Spain 2.91 3.11 0.20 1.58 0.56 -1.03
Sweden 1.33 2.40 1.07 1.30 1.76 0.46
United Kingdom 2.38 3.01 0.63 1.93 0.78 -1.15
Data summary: All 37 countries
Average (8 inflation targeters) 2.89 3.56 0.67 1.97 1.61 -0.36
Average (29 nontargeters)* 3.81 3.83 0.02 2.03 1.69 -0.34
Industrial countries only
Average (7 inflation targeters) 2.41 3.11 0.70 1.95 1.40 -0.55
Average (13 nontargeters)* 2.65 3.17 0.52 1.46 1.34 -0.12
* = For nontargeters,  the average between 1985 and 1994 and the average between 1995 and  2000 are compared.




Decrease  in inflation 
variability 
Increase in real GDP 
growth 
Decrease in real GDP 
variability




Decrease  in inflation 
variability 
Increase in real GDP 
growth 
Decrease in real GDP 
variability
t-test value  -4.28*** 0.66 0.78 -3.50***
*, ** and *** represent rejecting the null hypothesis of no significance at levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, 







                                        
Output 
variability/inflation 






Output growth (post-/pre-) -0.29*** 0.001 0.29 0.20
(0.14) (0.18) (0.23) (0.14)
Inflation rate (post-/pre-) 0.20 -0.09 -0.30 -0.61***
(0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.08)
Inflation targeting 0.17*** -0.04 -0.21 -0.11
(0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10)
Constant -0.20 -0.13 0.07 0.17
Number of observations 37 37 37 74
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 -0.02 0.06 0.45






Inflation targeting -0.04 -0.07
(0.09) (0.12)
Constant 0.16 0.24
Number of observations 74 74
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03Table 9  Factors affecting the level and variability of inflation
Independent variables Inflation rate Inflation variability
Expected 
sign Full  Final
Expected 
sign Full  Final
M2 growth (lagged) + .0963*** .1029*** + .0692*** .06900***
(.026) (.024) (.022) (.023)
Real GDP gap + -.2280* -.2203* + -0.3254 -.3120*
(.129) (.129) (.198) (.185)
GDP growth variability + 0.1019 0.1083 - 0.2019 0.2109
(.165) (.151) (.276) (.244)
Non-fuel commodity prices  + -0.0024 -0.0098 + -.0903* -0.0931
(.040) (.038) (.054) (.058)
Fiscal position  - -0.0652 - 0.0276
(.067) (.074)
Financial depth - -.0296*** -.0270*** - -.0091*** -.0110***
(.005) (.005) (.003) (.003)
Inflation targeting - -2.4268*** -2.4208*** - -0.6336 -0.6132
(.569) (.611) (.418) (.508)
Central bank autonomy - -1.2693** -1.9134*** - -0.089 -0.3099
(.506) (.504) (.483) (.350)
Trade openness + -.0104*** -.0187*** + -0.004 -.0062*
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004)
Terms of trade variability + .1197*** -0.016 + 0.018 -0.0076
(.046) (.038) (.025) (.019)
Floating exchange rate regime + 1.1352* 1.055* + -.6382* -.5840*
(de facto) (.597) (.572) (.383) (.334)
Foreign exchange pressure + 0.0739 + 0.9566
(.800) (.851)
REER variability + .0526** 0.0068 + 0.0080
(.022) (.021) (.025)
NEER variability + .1118*** .1128*** + .0584*** .0598***
(.028) (.028) (.016) (.016)
Current account ? -0.1207 ? -0.0645
(.074) (.045)
External debt ? 0.0076 ? -0.0004
(.006) (.006)
Constant 4.4105 6.6749 2.0397 2.5341
Number of observations 884 908 879 903
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.43 0.27 0.26
          1.  *, ** and *** represent rejecting the null hypothesis of no significance at levels of 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
          2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
          3. Regressions are based on the entire sample, excluding 15 countries with average inflation above 25 percent  
             over the 1980–2000 period; regressions include annual dummy variables that are not reported.Table 10   Factors affecting the level and variability of growth
Independent variables Real GDP growth  GDP growth variability
Expected 
sign Full  Final
Expected 
sign Full  Final
M2 growth (lagged) - -0.0064 + 0.0171
(.015) (.011)
Real GDP growth  + .4172*** .4278***
(.063) (.069)
GDP growth variability + .8085*** .7613***
(.269) (.236)
Inflation variability - -.1730*** -0.040 - 0.0806 0.0189
(.067) (.037) (.068) (.031)
Fiscal position  - -0.0208 ? .1654***
(.057) (.023)
Financial depth + 0.0006 - -0.0003
(.002) (.002)
Inflation targeting - .7460* .6217* + -.9154** -.7772*
(.423) (.329) (.385) (.416)
Central bank autonomy + 0.2584 0.1753 - -1.4736*** -1.493***
(.489) (.478) (.276) (.266)
Trade openness - 0.0050 0.0033 + -0.0001 0.0030
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.002)
Terms of trade variability - 0.0188 -0.0124 + -0.0183
(.021) (.020) (.020)
Floating exchange rate regime - -0.2811 + 0.0267 -0.0723
(de facto) (.387) (.246) (.218)
Foreign exchange pressure - -0.1955 -0.4403 + -0.0216
(.620) (.604) (.303)
REER variability ? -0.0036 ? .0280**
(.015) (.012)
NEER variability ? 0.0112 ? -0.0041 0.0032
(.012) (.005) (.004)
Current account ? 0.0059 ? -0.0467
(.066) (.031)
External debt ? -.0078* ? 0.0048
(.004) (.004)
Constant -1.5351 0.3214 6.4459 2.9642
Number of observations 878 951 878 948
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.37 0.54 0.47
          1. *, ** and *** represent rejecting the null hypothesis of no significance at levels of 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
          2. Standard errors are in parentheses.
          3. Regressions are based on the entire sample, excluding 15 countries with average inflation above 25 percent
              over the 1980–2000 period; regressions include annual dummy variables that are not reported.